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1	Introduction	
	
Football is unambiguously the national sport in Germany. No other sport attracts more people 
and has the power to connect more people of different ages, nationality or status. In football 
everyone is equal at least for 90 minutes. Having one favourite football club means having an 
emotional connection to it with celebrating the wins and suffering when the team loses. The 
German Bundesliga in particular is a magnet for fans coming into the stadium.  
 
Football is not only about emotion or the sport success itself. According to Jones (2003) 
today, topics like the salaries of the players, the television revenues or especially the transfer 
fees made up about 60 per cent of football stories on average. It is no surprise that football 
became a big business as many football clubs transformed into enterprises and the money 
amount as well as the amount of industries that are related to football and therefore the 
amount of stakeholders increased (Bühler, 2006). More and more investors now see that there 
is a great potential to invest their money in football clubs and get a high return on investment 
or publicity as they can present their products on a big stage.  
 
In the following, the different meanings of an investor will be explained as wells as their 
reasons for investing in a football club. Furthermore, the investor presence in the German 
Bundesliga and the English Premier League will be compared. Moreover, the clubs VfL 
Wolfsburg, Bayer 04 Leverkusen, the TSG 1899 Hoffenheim and RB Leipzig will be 
analysed and explained how they could achieve to be owned by an investor, although there is 
the 50+1 rule that says that clubs have to be owned by their members. Then, a closer look will 
be given to the question if investors are necessary to have a more competitive league or lead 
to a distortion of competition in the Bundesliga. 
 
2	Investors	
	
2.1	Investor	Presence	and	their	Reasons	for	Investing	
	
There are two types of investors. The formal investors (natural person or legal entity) who 
obtains shares by providing money to the club and which also leads to contractual obligations 
and on the other hand, there are patrons who support the club financially without any service 
in return and therefore they are not contractually obligated according to Kindler (2014). 
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However, for many investors it is not the control or the profits that are interesting but rather 
something that brings them some esteem as it is “like buying a Picasso” (Szymanski, 2015, p. 
6). 
 
According to Birkhäuser, et al.( 2015), sponsorship payments can also be seen as investor 
payments, but only if the sponsors are direct shareholders like in the case of FC Bayern 
Munich with the Adidas AG, Allianz SE and Audi AG that together hold about 25 per cent. 
Other than English clubs, German clubs are dependent on sponsorship income as they do not 
generate as much income on match days with ticketing or broadcasting rights as English clubs 
do. Many years ago, sponsorship deals were more a kind of patronage from local firms but 
with the increasing popularity of football with sometimes even national wide or international 
reach “clubs soon became marketing tools for companies” (Bühler, 2006, p. 32). 
  
When having a look at figure 1, it can be seen that the investor payments play the most 
significant role in England but also in Germany, France and Italy the payments have become 
more important. The payments for German clubs raised continuously after a decline in the 
season 2011/12.  With about 95 per cent, especially clubs from the highest leagues of the 
countries receive the most money (Birkhäuser, et al., 2015). They have the power to reach a 
much wider range of audience and are therefore more interesting for investors like companies 
that want to place their products or brand names on the jerseys, busses or at the stadium for 
example.  
Figure 1: Payment of investors to clubs of major European football leagues (Birkhäuser, et al., 2015, p. 8) 
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2.2	Comparison	of	the	Investments	in	England	and	Germany	
	
According to Key Note (2002), especially in England as well as in Germany football is 
regarded as a national sport while at the same time being part of the most business-driven 
football leagues. There are four professional leagues with 92 clubs in England compared to 
two professional leagues in Germany with 36 teams (Bühler, 2006). These professional clubs 
have one in common, they need capital to survive.  
 
Investor payments always have something to do with the ownership of shares and voting 
rights. At this point, a huge difference of the ownership structure of professional football 
clubs between England and Germany can be emphasized. Other than in England, many 
German clubs only outsourced their professional team in a company in recent years while in 
England most of the clubs have been Public Limited Companies for many years, many of 
them even since their foundation according to Bühler (2006). The clubs of the English 
Premier League seem to be very attractive to investors as they are very popular even in 
foreign countries around the globe. It is therefore not surprising that nearly all Premier 
League clubs have an external investor.  
 
Asian or Arabic business people invest their money in the Premier League as even clubs that 
are lower ranked in the league receive secure television revenues and are more popular in 
Asia or the Middle East than most of the German clubs (Goff, 2007). The most famous 
investors are the Russian Roman Abramowitsch who bought FC Chelsea for about €210 
million and sheik Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan from Abu Dhabi who bought all shares of 
Manchester City in 2009 with his company ADUG. He has invested more than €1billion until 
now (Heun, 2016). In the other top clubs of the Premier League, investors can also be found 
like Malcom Glazer (Manchester United), George Gillet and Tom Hicks (FC Liverpool) and 
Stan Kroenke who payed €100 million to buy shares of Arsenal London (Pfeil, 2008). 
 
The German investor payments to football clubs are small peanuts compared to those of the 
Premier League.  A huge imbalance can be found with only FC Bayern, VfL Wolfsburg, 
Bayer 04 Leverkusen, TSG 1899 Hoffenheim and RB Leipzig having external investors and 
Burussia Dortmund being the only German football club on the stock exchange. Since last 
year, Hertha BSC has also received investor payments by finance investor KKR of €61.2 
million for about 10 per cent of the shares of the Hertha BSC GmbH & Co. KGaA. With this 
money the club is able to rebuy marketing rights and television rights for example. But on the 
	External Investors in the German Football Bundesliga  Melanie Emeneth 
4	
other hand, a finance investor like KKR only invest for a duration of five to seven years and 
then tries to sale the shares with a profit (Dierig, 2014) but then, Hertha has no influence in 
the decision process to who the shares are sold to.  
 
3	The	Club	Ownership	Rule	in	Germany	
	
3.1	The	50	+1	Rule	
	
Such high foreign investments like in England cannot be found in Germany except of Hertha 
with KKR from the United States and the TSV 1860 Munich that plays in the second highest 
football league and that has given 49 per cent of the voting rights to a business man from 
Kuwait. Therefore, scenarios like those in England have not been possible so far. In German 
professional football (for 36 teams) exists a unique rule that cannot be found in any other 
football league. 
 
This model is called the 50+1 rule and says that the majority of 50 per cent plus one more 
voting right must be in the hands of the club members. There are also high investment 
opportunities but as a result of the rule clubs should be prevented to be controlled by their 
investors. That means that the club board should still be made up of by shareholders selected 
delegates. The shareholders or supporters are viewed as participant and not just as a fan. It is 
also a protection against unserious investors who could use a club generated surplus for 
paying off other debts that could be resulted from a non-football business (Kindler, 2014). 
	
It is important to be mentioned that the voting rights of an investor are limited to 49 per cent 
due to the 50+1 rule while a patron officially does not own any voting rights but as “the club 
must continuously earn the patron’s goodwill, his intensions have to be considered even 
without formal controlling rights” (Kindler, 2014, p. 38).  That means that a patron has 
control over the club more or less and this could also be more than 49 per cent although, as 
mentioned before, a patron officially does not have any voting rights and therefore no control.	
	
There are also some exceptions like Bayer 04 Leverkusen or VfL Wolfsburg that are 100 per 
cent company-owned or the TSG 1899 Hoffenheim that is now officially owned by Dietmar 
Hopp, its patron for many years. FC Bayern Munich still owns 75.01 per cent whereas the 
Audi AG, Allianz SE and Adidas hold 8.33 per cent, respectively. The insurance concern 
Allianz payed €110 million to Bayern in exchange for the shares, for example (Dierig, 2014). 
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3.2	VfL	Wolfsburg	and	Bayer	04	Leverkusen	
	
An exception of the 50+1 rule is called LEX Leverkusen and is applied to two clubs of the 
Bundesliga. This rule says that an investor is allowed to own a football club if he has helped 
the club financially for 20 years without any interruption and the support has started before 1st 
January 1999. This is the case with the club VfL Wolfsburg and Bayer Leverkusen that have 
been company-owned since their foundation in the VfL Wolfsburg Fußball GmbH and the 
Bayer 04 Leverkusen Fußball GmbH. The VfL Wolfsburg is now 100 per cent owned by the 
German car manufacturer Volkswagen AG and Bayer 04 Leverkusen is 100 per cent owned 
by the pharmaceutic company Bayer AG (Kindler, 2014). 
 
Other than Bayer, Volkswagen is a big investor in the German football league. Alongside the 
ownership of Wolfsburg, the company owns 20 per cent of FC Ingolstadt and 8.33 per cent of 
Bayern Munich. The rule of multiple ownership says that an investor is allowed to own shares 
of three teams but it is only allowed to hold shares higher than 10 per cent on one club. The 
shares of the other two clubs must be under 10 per cent (Kindler, 2014). 
 
3.3	TSG	1899	Hoffenheim	and	RB	Leipzig	
	
With Hoffenheim and Leipzig, two other clubs achieved to go round the 50+1 rule. The 
members of the two clubs officially have the majority of the voting rights but unofficially 
their investors, Dietmar Hopp (Hoffenheim) and the energy drink supplier Red Bull (Leipzig) 
have already owned the clubs for many years.  
 
The TSG Hoffenheim, a club from a small village with about 3,000 inhabitants, was founded 
with the fusion of the gymnastics club Hoffenheim and a football club Hoffenheim. Only with 
the financial investment of Dietmar Hopp, their patron, the club has promoted from an 
amateur club in the ninth tier, the Kreisliga A, to the highest football league in Germany, the 
Bundesliga, in only 18 years (Humphreys, 2016).  Hopp is the most famous patron in German 
football and is known to be one of the wealthiest Germans. The software entrepreneur made 
his money especially as co-founder of the SAP AG. When he was younger, he played for the 
youth team of TSG Hoffenheim and now being a billionaire his intention is to develop the 
Rhein-Neckar region to a sport region. 
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According to an article by Jackson (2008), he has not only invested in the professional 
football team but also in the whole infrastructure. He invested in the stadium (30,000 seats), 
the training centre and especially in the youth-development centres. As Hopp is emotionally 
connected with the club his investment is sustainable although 51 per cent has to be owned by 
the members. He also owns the stadium and the training centre which is both rented by the 
TSG Hoffenheim (Jackson, 2008). Hopp owned 49 per cent as a sleeping partnership of the 
TSG 1899 Hoffenheim Fußballbetriebs GmbH while according to Keoghan (2014), it is 
believed that he had far more influence in the club. Since 2015, he has officially owned the 
club as he has supported the professional team as well as the amateur team for more than 20 
years without interruptions. The members of the club voted unanimous to become Hopp as 
owner. Since 1989, he has invested about €350 million (Heun, 2016). 
 
RB Leipzig is a complete different example as it is financed by Red Bull, a big company that 
also uses the presence that comes with the sponsorship of a football club for marketing its 
products on a big stage as it is primarily a marketing company (Heun, 2016). Except of 
Leipzig, Red Bull bought a club in Salzburg, New York and clubs from Brazil and Ghana. 
Red Bull initially tried to take over the FC Sachsen Leipzig which failed and lead to an 
interest of the company to a small club named SSVMarkranstädt in 2009 (Bidwell, 2015). 
 
As Red Bull was prohibited by the German Football League to rename the club to Red Bull 
Leipzig, it found a solution with the name RasenBallsport Leipzig which has the same short 
version, RB Leipzig. Another sign that Red Bull uses the football to market its products is that 
all the five clubs play in a stadium which is renamed Red Bull Arena, have RB in their names 
and are called The Bulls.  
 
Since there is the 50+1 rule in Germany, Red Bull is not allowed to own the majority of the 
voting rights. It therefore found a loophole that does not violate the rule. The club is a 
supporter-owned club, in German “Eingetragener Verein”, and has eleven members, all of 
them are employees of Red Bull who work in the headquarters. That is why Red Bull 
unofficially holds 100 per cent of the voting rights. They also have the right to reject any 
other membership requests without giving an explanation (Bidwell, 2015). With the 
investment of Red Bull boss Dietrich Mateschitz, the club, that was just formed seven years 
ago, is now part of the Bundesliga since it has promoted from second Bundesliga in the 
season 2015/16.  
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4	Distortion	of	Competition?	
	
As examined in this paper, there are already quite a few a football clubs in Germany that have 
an investor. But does it automatically mean that these clubs are more successful than clubs 
without an investor and what does it mean for their dominance in their domestic leagues? 
 
According to an article (Quitzau, 2014), football would tend to go in the same direction as it 
goes now if investors would only invest in traditional clubs that have a high fan base. With 
Hoffenheim and Leipzig in the Bundesliga and 1860 Munich in the second Bundesliga, the 
opposite is true. It is more and more invested in smaller clubs with no tradition, a small fan 
base and where it is easier for investors to control the club and where they think they can 
increase their profits in a short time for example due to a promotion in the Bundesliga. That is 
the reason why the German Bundesliga could develop in another direction with more plastic 
clubs (company-owned or investor-owned with no tradition) and the traditional clubs finding 
themselves in lower leagues like the Karlsruher SC with the relegation into the third league 
just after it had relegated into the second Bundesliga in the previous year. This can also be 
shown on two recent examples, as the two traditional clubs without these high external 
investments namely the VfB Stuttgart and Hannover 96 fell back from the Bundesliga into the 
second Bundesliga in the season 2015/16 although alone the VfB Stuttgart has more fans 
coming to the stadium on match days than Hoffenheim and Leipzig together.  
 
In the season 2015/16 Leipzig was in the second Bundesliga but with tens of millions for 
transfers, the club was able to invest more money in new players than most of the other teams 
in the second highest football league. One player of these transfers was Davie Selke who were 
bought for about €8 million from Werder Bremen which played in the Bundesliga, one league 
higher than Leipzig did at that time (Nordmann, 2016). At the end of the season, Leipzig 
achieved to promote into the Bundesliga.  
 
It can therefore be stated that the money especially helps lower-league teams like 
Hoffenheim, Leipzig or Ingolstadt (Volkswagen owns 20 per cent) to become more dominant 
in their leagues and the possibility to promote into a higher league also increases which can be 
proved as all of the three clubs have achieved the promotion into the Bundesliga within a few 
years after they had been supported by an investor. If the clubs that are supported by an 
investor are in the highest football league, then to become dominant just because of the 
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money by investors is more difficult as there the traditional revenues are also higher than in 
lower leagues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As figure 2 shows, in the last fifty years, there was one team that won almost the half of the 
national championships in Germany, that means that this team (FC Bayern) nearly won the 
title in the domestic league every two years. In the last quarter of the year, the number of wins 
has increased by this team. At the same time, the number of winners fell from nine to six in 
the last twenty-five years compared to the previous twenty-five ones. Szymanski (2015) also 
concentrated on the fact that during the period of the last quarter with 79 per cent one of the 
top three teams were always the winner of the championships in the domestic leagues. 
Compared to the previous twenty-five years where it was 73 per cent. That shows that a type 
of dominance has always been there also before there were external investors. However, as 
the dominance of the top clubs tended to increase, the external investor payments can help the 
other clubs to become more competitive and thus it could lead to a more competitive league. 
 
A fact that is true for clubs that have more money available is that they are able to buy players 
from other clubs, especially from the most competitive clubs like Bayern also did with Mario 
Götze or Robert Lewandowski from Dortmund. This also means that without the help of 
Figure 2: Most wins by one club and number of winners during 
the last 50 years (Szymanski, 2015) 
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external investors not many or even no club can compete with the FC Bayern nor win the 
national championship. According to Szymanski (2015), the money that external investors 
bring into the league is almost shared by the clubs as the team that sells the player for a high 
transfer fee can also benefit from the transfer revenues. 
 
5	Conclusion	
 
In the future, more football clubs are dependent on investor payments as the traditional 
revenue streams like selling television rights, sponsoring, ticketing or merchandising won’t 
have a high potential to increase (Dierig, 2014). According to the same article (Dierig, 2014), 
especially clubs like Hertha BSC Berlin attract the interest of investors as they have a good 
infrastructure, many fans and there is a positive prediction that revenues could increase in a 
short time. As a conclusion of this paper external investors should not be seen as the trigger 
that leads to a distortion of competition but rather as a possibility for the Bundesliga to remain 
and to become more competitive.  
 
However, as long as the 50+1 rule still exists in Germany it is unfair as there are some 
exceptions of the rule a few clubs can benefit from but other clubs have a disadvantage from. 
Many clubs want to have external investors that even own them but are not able because they 
cannot benefit from the exceptions of the rule as they have not been supported for more than 
20 years by the investors. Hannover 96 tried it for many years and were not allowed to sell 
shares of more than 49 per cent. Last season the club were relegated to the second Bundesliga 
and is finally allowed to be owned by the company of Martin Kind, their president, in 2008 
(Heun, 2016). The view of Martin Kind is that the rule should be abolished or at least adapted 
to the modern football otherwise many clubs of the Bundesliga won’t be able to compete in 
the national championship nor compete internationally (Jackson, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, the clubs must be careful because they often do not have a high profit as 
their main goal is to win the maximum of its matches and therefore put the whole money they 
have and sometimes even more in that goal. The results are high debts that bring the risk of 
disappearing along (Szymanski, 2015). Clubs that are supported by an investor are especially 
affected as it is expected that they have to win because of the high investments. It is therefore 
very important to find serious investors because most of the clubs owe their debts to their 
owners (Szymanski, 2015) and thus it seems that they are debt free because these debts are 
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not to be found in their accounts but when the investor leaves the club, it does not matter 
because of which reason, the club has a big problem. 
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